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If Pay-as-bid auctions are not a solution for California, then Why not a reliability market?

C. Vázquez, M. Rivier, I.J. Pérez-Arriaga

The Electricity Journal Vol. 14, nº. 4, pp. 41 - 48

Resumen:

This document presents some ideas regarding the use of the pay-as-bid pricing rule in multi-unit auctions. In particular, we focus on electricity markets and on the proposals for adopting this kind of mechanism in the California Power Exchange. We find that the pay-as-bid auction has important drawbacks. Instead, we attack the recent problems in California from another point of view and propose an alternative solution.


Referencia DOI: DOI icon https://doi.org/10.1016/S1040-6190(01)00196-8

Publicado en papel: Mayo 2001.

Publicado on-line: Junio 2001.



Cita:
C. Vázquez, M. Rivier, I.J. Pérez-Arriaga, If Pay-as-bid auctions are not a solution for California, then Why not a reliability market?. The Electricity Journal. Vol. 14, nº. 4, pp. 41 - 48, Mayo 2001. [Online: Junio 2001]


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