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Expansion Planning in Electricity Markets. Two different approaches Proceedings

M. Ventosa, R. Denis, C. Redondo

This paper presents two different approaches to model expansion planning in electricity markets under imperfect competitive conditions. Both approaches ocnsider a market in which firms compete in quantity as in the Nash-Cournot game. However, the two models differ from each other in how earch firm makes its expansion-planning decisions. In the first model, the key assumption that permits its formulation as a Mixed Linead Complementarity Problem (LCP) is that firms not only decide their output in a Cournot manner but also their new generating capacity. In contrast, in the second model, there is a leader firm that anticipates the reaction of the follower firms as in the Stackelberg game. The latter model is formulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibriun Constraints (MPE), wherein the leader firm decides its optimal new capacity subject to a set of market equilibrium constraints. Both models have been implemented in GAMS. A simple example is also presented to illustrate their comparison and application.

Keywords: Complementarity problem, nash-cournot, mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints, stackelberg

14th Power systems computation conference -PSCC, Session 43-4, pp. 1-8, Seville, 24-28 June 2002

Publicado: junio 2002.

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