We develop a MILP framework to optimally design risk-sharing/winner-selection mechanisms, applying a principal-agent approach to bidding processes to select transmission agents, with attention to cases when uncertainties in implementation times of transmission facilities are an issue and regulators must deal with uncertain information regarding efficiency and risk-aversion of possible bidders. Conclusions are drawn with aid of case studies.
Keywords: Transmission implementation, risk-sharing, winner-selection, principal-agent approach, competitive bidding.
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Volumen: 33 Numero: 6 Páginas: 6951-6965
Journal Impact Factor: JCR impact factor 5.255 (2017)
DOI reference: 10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2837383
Publicado en papel: Noviembre 2018. Publicado on-line: Mayo 2018.