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Multi-agent coalition formation in power transmission planning: A bilateral shapley value approach

J. Contreras, M. Klusch, F.F. Wu

Deregulation and restructuring have become unavoidable trends to the power industry recently, in order to increase its efficiency, to reduce operation costs, or to provide customers a better service. The once centralized system planning and management must be remodeled to reflect the changes in the market environment. We propose and have developed a multi-agent based system to assist players such as owners of power generation stations, owners of transmission lines and groups of customers, to select partners to form coalitions. The system provides a cooperation plan and its associated cost allocation plan for the user to support its decision making process. Among several coalition formation and cost allocation criteria, we have selected the bilateral Shapley value as the theoreticakl foundation to develop the system. We have tested the multi-agent system with a classical transmission expansion example. See Javier Contreras' personal homepages: http://www.iit.upco.es/~javierc and/or http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~javier for more details.


Palabras clave: Transmision Planning, cooperative game theory, multi-agent systems

International Conference on Electrical Power Systems, Operation and Management, EPSOM '98, Zúrich (Suiza). 23 septiembre 1998

Fecha de publicación: septiembre 1998.



Cita:
J. Contreras, M. Klusch, F.F. Wu, Multi-agent coalition formation in power transmission planning: A bilateral shapley value approach, International Conference on Electrical Power Systems, Operation and Management, EPSOM '98, Zurich, Suiza, 23-25 Septiembre 1998.


    Líneas de investigación:

IIT-98-070A

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